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Prenatal Screening for Down’s Syndrome: Parent and Healthcare Practitioner 
Experiences 




This article reviews research on both parent and healthcare practitioner experiences of 
prenatal screening for Down’s syndrome. Whilst studies on Down’s syndrome screening 
are broad in scope and diverge in theoretical and epistemological foundations, their 
core focus can be classified into two main and intertwining categories: 1) the decision-
making practices of expectant parents and why they do/do not participate in screening; 
2) the interactions between parents and practitioners, particularly the discrepancies of 
knowledge and the pursuit of “informed choice” and “non-directive care.” To conclude, I 




It is almost one-hundred-and-fifty years since John Langdon Down, an English 
physician, first described a condition which was later defined as “mongolism.” In 1961, 
however, the condition was renamed “Down’s syndrome” (or Trisomy 21) after a 
prestigious group of biomedical researchers signed a letter objecting to the 
“embarrassing term” of mongolism (Allen et al. 1961, 426). Down’s syndrome is one of 
the most common chromosomal conditions in the world, affecting approximately one to 
two of every 1000 live births in England and Wales alone (Morris and Springett 2013).1 
People with Down’s syndrome are likely to have a range of symptoms including learning 
difficulties, shortened limbs, reduced muscle tone, restricted physical growth, a flat 
profile of the face, and a large protruding tongue (NHS FASP 2012). However, the 
condition is frequently identified as compatible with life, that is, as “not lethal” (Ivry 
2009, 192). This translates to people with Down’s syndrome being likely to survive 
childbirth and enjoying a good quality of life, although symptoms and prognosis vary 
significantly in each respective case. Indeed, the main feature of Down’s syndrome is the 
inconsistency of its manifestation. However, due to medical advances and better 
knowledge regarding treatment and care, children with the condition can survive 
beyond sixty years today (CARIS 2012). 
In the past fifty years, Down’s syndrome has occupied a central position in 
reproductive politics, particularly in Western healthcare systems. Prenatal screening for 
the condition has become a universal programme, coming into “routine use, becoming 
embedded in, we might say, a social matrix” (Cowan 1994, 36). Whilst predicted 
advances of genetic screening generally may be more modest than initially expected, the 
range of available screening techniques for Down’s syndrome (and other conditions) 
has steadily expanded.2 In 2011, roughly 74% (N=542,312) of all expectant parents in 
England and Wales – or rather those accessing NHS services – opted to be screened for 
Down’s syndrome (NHS FASP 2012). The uptake in prenatal screening has dramatically 
increased annually in England and Wales since 2007 (53%). Whilst 2008 and 2009 saw 
uptake rates of 57% and 62% respectively, an uptake rate of 70% was recorded in 2010 
(NHS FASP 2012). This differs from the Netherlands where uptake rates for Down’s 
syndrome screening vary from 38% to 86% (van den Berg et al. 2005a) and Japan 
where uptake rates are less than 2% (Nishiyama et al. 2013). The increase in England 
and Wales uptake rates may be attributable to the recent increase in maternal age (an 
increase in maternal age is the only known attribute increasing the chance of an unborn 
baby being diagnosed with Down’s syndrome), the risk of miscarriage decreasing on 
account of increasingly proficient screening technologies (Budds et al. 2013; NHS FASP 
2012; ONS 2011), and service supply factors since all mothers-to-be (rather than just 
mothers-to-be aged thirty-five and above as in earlier years) are now offered screening 
for the condition. The lower uptake rates in Japan, in contrast, are perhaps attributable 
to a lack of information on prenatal diagnosis and abortion not being legally permitted 
for “foetal abnormalities” (Nishiyama et al. 2013, 796). 
In addition, a report conducted by the National Down’s Syndrome Cytogenetic 
Register (NDSCR) claims in 2011, there were 1,873 diagnoses of the condition, 65% of 
which were made prenatally (N=1,211), in England and Wales (Morris and Springett 
2013). According to the report, of the 1,211 prenatal diagnoses, 89% (N=931) were 
terminated, 8% (N=87) were live births, and 3% (N=33) were natural miscarriages or 
stillbirths (the outcome of 160 prenatal diagnoses is unknown). The proportion of 
terminations following a diagnosis of the condition in England and Wales has remained 
steady for over twenty years. From the first report in 1989 until 2011, the annual rates 
for termination after a diagnosis of Down’s syndrome have ranged from 88% to 94% 
(the mean rate is 91%). This corresponds to the work of Boyd et al. (2008) who claim 
that ten out of eighteen European countries have an average termination rate of 88% 
after a prenatal diagnosis of Down’s syndrome. Similarly, in certain areas of Australia 
and select US states, the termination rates following a diagnosis are reported as 95% 
(Collins et al. 2008) and 74% (Natoli et al. 2012) respectively. However, it is crucial to 
remember that many countries do not track termination rates for Down syndrome on a 
national scale. This is likely to be related to local variations in laws, with termination 
being illegal in countries such as Northern Ireland (McNeill et al. 2009). Nonetheless, it 
is clear how Down’s syndrome screening has been centrally located in reproductive 
politics and how it has subsequently been the subject of much academic attention. 
I begin this article by providing a brief context of Down’s syndrome screening 
and testing. In what follows, I identify sociological studies, inevitably sharing overlaps 
with other disciplines, largely focused on two core and interrelated aspects of screening 
for Down’s syndrome: 1) the decision-making process of expectant parents and why 
they do or do not participate in screening; 2) the interactions between parents and 
practitioners, particularly regarding discrepancies in understandings and how these are 
negotiated, managed, and rectified by each party. This latter focus is most frequently 
directed at the level of the intertwining rhetoric of “informed choice” and “non-directive 
care.” Whilst studies have examined the social significance of diagnostic testing for 
Down’s syndrome (Browner and Preloran 1999; Bryant et al. 2006; Crang-Svalenius et 
al. 1998; Rapp 2000) or used screening/diagnostic testing interchangeably (Green and 
Statham 1996; Jaques et al. 2004; Kaiser et al. 2004; Marteau 1995; Press and Browner 
1997), I focus exclusively on screening not least because of restricted word space and, 
more importantly, because screening is important enough to be lifted out of broad 
debates around universal screening/testing programmes. To reiterate, a screening test 
does not produce a diagnosis but rather provides expectant parents with information 
about the chance of their baby having a condition. In contrast, a diagnostic test can 
establish the presence or absence of a condition in a child, although it should be noted 
that diagnostic tests are not 100% accurate and are susceptible to human error (Austin 
et al. 2013). 
The studies cited around Down’s syndrome screening derive from different 
countries (and thus diverse social, cultural, economic, political, and medical contexts), 
use both qualitative and quantitative methods,3 focus on aspects of Down’s syndrome 
screening at different periods of a pregnancy (pre-screening, mid-screening, post-
screening), and stem from scholarly roots including sociology, public health, medicine 
(midwifery, nursing, genetics), anthropology, psychology and bioethics. The reader 
therefore needs to place this review within this diverse context. I conclude by 
highlighting knowledge gaps and future directions of sociological research. Thus, this 
article is not a systematic review in the narrow sense but rather highlights current work 
in the field, both qualitative and quantitative, and what knowledge gaps subsequently 
persist. 
 
Prenatal screening for Down’s syndrome: a context 
Prenatal screening for Down’s syndrome results in expectant parents receiving a “risk 
factor,” a numerical probability establishing the odds of an unborn baby having the 
condition. The characteristics used for creating this risk factor are locally variable and a 
variety of risk factors can be produced including a background risk (based on age, 
ethnicity, pregnancy history, weight, gestation, smoking habits, the number of unborn 
babies, and a nuchal translucency measurement4, among others), a biochemistry risk 
(based on the measurements of biochemical markers), an adjusted risk (based on 
combining a background risk and biochemistry risk), and an ultrasound risk (based on 
the nuchal translucency size alone). As such, different probabilities are possible for the 
same pregnancy which might affect the higher-risk categorisation. The risk factors 
provided to expectant parents vary between hospitals. In NHS hospitals in Wales, for 
example, expectant parents usually only receive the adjusted risk factor for Down’s 
syndrome (in Wales, screening for Down’s syndrome via ultrasound scanning is only 
available at privately-funded institutions). 
After screening, expectant parents are categorised as “lower-risk” or “higher-
risk.” In NHS hospitals, for example, the recommended national cut-off level for this 
categorisation is 1:150 (a 1 in 150 “risk” of having a baby with Down’s syndrome). 
However, this varies between countries and depends on political/economic factors 
together with whether national screening policies are established (Boyd et al. 2008). 
According to Boyd et al., for example, diagnostic testing is routinely offered to expectant 
mothers aged thirty-five and above in Germany and Spain independent of a risk factor. 
Taking England and Wales once more as an example, if expectant parents receive a risk 
factor numerically higher than 1:150 (e.g. 1:300), they are “lower-risk” and not offered 
diagnostic testing (amniocentesis or chorionic villus sampling/CVS). In contrast, if they 
receive a risk factor numerically lower than 1:150 (e.g. 1:50), they are “higher-risk” and 
diagnostic testing can be arranged to prove or refute a suspected diagnosis. For Gross 
and Shuval (2008, 550), this reflects a shift in medicine “from the actual to the 
potential.” It should be clarified that each screening method is considered as having a 
“false-positive rate,” meaning expectant parents receive a positive (higher-risk) result 
but do not have an unborn baby with Down’s syndrome. The false-positive rate is 
crucial (as well as controversial) since it indicates the number of unaffected pregnancies 
subjected to diagnostic tests which have a one to two percent chance of causing a 
miscarriage. 
If expectant parents decide against diagnostic testing, no further screening or 
testing for Down’s syndrome is typically offered. If expectant parents consent to testing 
and a diagnosis is established, counselling is offered by a healthcare practitioner – who 
this is and from what speciality is locally specific – before a decision must be made 
about continuing or terminating a pregnancy. Around three to five percent of pregnant 
women consenting to screening receive a higher-risk result (NHS FASP 2012) and 
according to Buckley and Buckley (2008), between 1 in 20 and 1 in 30 higher-risk 
(screen-positive) results detect an unborn baby with Down’s syndrome. Uptake rates 
for diagnostic testing following a higher risk result for Down’s could not be identified, 
nor could statistics about the number of foetal losses after a diagnostic test be located. 
The main objective of prenatal screening is to identify women in whom a risk factor is 
deemed high enough to warrant offering diagnostic testing. More information on, and 
the socio-histories of, screening/testing for Down’s syndrome, as well as the condition 
itself, are offered elsewhere (Cowan 1994; Nancollas 2012; Rapp 2000; Selikowitz 
2008; Wright 2011). 
 
Existing insights 
From here, I review research on both parent and healthcare practitioner experiences of 
prenatal screening for Down’s syndrome. Taken together, these studies recognise how 
screening is a social as well as medical intervention (Armstrong 2012; Armstrong and 
Eborall 2012; Boardman 2010; Buchbinder and Timmermans 2013; Cowan 2008; Cox 
and McKellin 1999; Faulkner 2012; Gillespie 2012; Hogarth et al. 2012; Kehr 2012; Lock 
et al. 2007). Whilst several studies have explored parent and practitioner experiences of 
prenatal screening for Down’s syndrome, this has predominantly focused on two core 
concerns: 1) the decision-making processes of expectant parents; 2) the interactions 
between parents and practitioners. In what follows, I turn my attention to these studies 
and their contribution to the field. 
 
Decision-making process of expectant parents 
The development and diffusion of prenatal screening techniques has triggered critical 
debates around the seemingly contradictory aspects of offering reproductive choice to – 
and prompting social, legal, and ethical dilemmas for – expectant parents. As such, there 
has been a proliferation of studies focusing on reproductive practices more generally 
and how expectant parents must make serious life decisions frequently on the basis of 
partial knowledge (Ettorre 2000; Franklin and Roberts 2006; Glover 2006; Parens and 
Asch 2000; Rapp 2000; Rothman 1986; Rothschild 2005; Schwennesen et al. 2010; 
Thompson 2005). In relation to Down’s syndrome screening, much of the literature 
centres on the decision-making processes of expectant parents and how they justify 
certain choices. Common justifications for consenting to screening include, but are not 
limited to, offering reassurance about an unborn baby being unlikely to have Down’s 
syndrome (García et al. 2008; McNeill et al. 2009; Santalahti et al. 1998), satisfying 
curiosity about an unborn baby (Skirton and Barr 2007; van den Berg et al. 2005a), 
fulfilling demands of a partner (Jaques et al. 2004), and a fear of supporting and 
parenting a child with a disability (Chiang et al. 2006; Pilnick and Zayts 2012; 
Remennick 2006). This trepidation or “tentativeness” (Rothman 1986) was most often 
felt by expectant mothers who shouldered a moral duty to prevent what is expected to 
be the burden of a disabled child on their family (Chiang et al. 2006; García et al. 2011; 
Gross 2010; Ivry 2006; Remennick 2006). A similar fear is reported by expectant 
parents with previous pregnancy experiences and/or a family history of chromosomal 
conditions, citing this when accounting for their decision to have screening (McNeill et 
al. 2009; Spencer 2002). One of the most common justifications for participating in 
screening, however, is that expectant mothers perceive themselves as being at an 
“advanced maternal age”, translating to women aged thirty-five and above, since this is 
the only known attribute increasing the risk of an unborn baby being diagnosed with 
Down’s syndrome (Kaiser et al. 2004; McNeill et al. 2009). It should be noted that 
decision-making processes are immensely complex and expectant parents are likely to 
account for their decision with reference to several of these explanations. Indeed, 
expectant parents are frequently conflicted about whether to know or not to know (Aune 
and Möller 2012; Liamputtong et al. 2003). 
 Several of these studies appear to understand consenting to Down’s syndrome 
screening as a result of rational decision-making processes. However, others identify 
how Down’s syndrome screening is an instance of conformity rather than an expression 
of choice (Chiang et al. 2006; Gottfreðsdóttir et al. 2009b; Heyman et al. 2006; Markens 
et al. 1999; Marteau 1995; Pilnick 2004; Pilnick et al. 2004; Press and Browner 1997; 
Remennick 2006; Santalahti et al. 1998; Skirton and Barr 2007; Sooben 2010; Williams 
et al. 2005). The title of an article by Gottfreðsdóttir et al. (2009a) – “this is just what 
you do when you are pregnant” – seems apt for highlighting this conformity and routine 
nature of screening. Hunt et al. (2005) likewise claim that expectant parents in their 
study did not have a clear understanding of the nature of screening since they viewed it 
as a standard and recommended part of routine care. For Gottfreðsdóttir et al. (2009b), 
this interpretation of Down’s syndrome screening as a “normal part of the surveillance 
of ordinary pregnancies” (Vassy 2006, 2042) reflects how some expectant parents do 
not discuss screening and testing prior to consenting to a procedure. The routine nature 
of screening, according to other research, is also borne out of practitioners seemingly 
endorsing its acceptance (Heyman et al. 2006; McNeill et al. 2009; Remennick 2006) 
and how ultrasound scans can be viewed, first and foremost, as offering a chance for 
meeting the baby, and for making a pregnancy seem more real, rather than for detecting 
potential medical concerns (Draper 2002; Gammeltoft and Nyugen 2007; Heyman et al. 
2006; Lupton 2013; Mitchell and Georges 1998; Williams et al. 2005). In a similar vein, 
Tsouroufli (2011) claims that expectant parents opt for screening as a routine aspect of 
antenatal care because of the prompt processing of expectant parents in the hospital, 
because practitioners endorse it as a safe test (no chance of a miscarriage), and because 
practitioners expect that expectant parents will opt for the procedure. 
For the likes of Baillie et al. (2000) and Åhman et al. (2010), the naturalisation of 
Down’s syndrome screening as a “normal” part of pregnancy means expectant parents 
are not always aware of, or prepared for, the complex information and heavy choices 
associated with a screening result. Many studies, indeed, have reported how screening 
prompts feelings of fear and anxiety among expectant parents before, during, and/or 
after receiving a lower-risk or higher-risk result for Down’s syndrome (Aune and Möller 
2012; Burton-Jeangros et al. 2013; Green and Statham 1996; Ivry 2006; Markens et al. 
1999; Marteau 1995; Pilnick et al. 2004; Remennick 2006; Williams et al. 2005). For 
Heyman et al. (2006) and Hunt et al. (2005), this angst, sadness, and grief frequently 
emerge following a higher-risk result and a decision needing to be made about 
diagnostic testing. In their study of doctors and pregnant women, Burton-Jeangros et al. 
(2013) employ Giddens’ (1991: 70) conception of “manufactured uncertainty” to 
identify how tensions exist between the pursuit of control by surrendering to medical 
surveillance processes, the permanence of uncertainty in life processes, and the 
limitations of probabilistic data (i.e. the difficulty of interpreting a “risk factor”). 
Strategies of managing and negotiating this higher-risk result include developing 
interpretations via metaphors (Burton-Jeangros et al. 2013) or remaining emotionally 
detached from an unborn baby in the event of decisions needing to be made around a 
termination of pregnancy (Remennick 2006; Williams et al. 2005). This work shows 
that whilst expectant parents may engage with screening to abate anxiety and receive 
reassurance, they can simultaneously become anxious about waiting for results, be 
confronted with distressing decisions about diagnostic testing, and can be apprehensive 
and fearful even after a lower-risk result (Burton-Jeangros et al. 2013; Marteau 1995; 
Pilnick et al. 2004). 
Studies have also reported on why expectant parents do not take up prenatal 
screening for Down’s syndrome. Justifications include avoiding the adverse health risks 
associated with potential diagnostic testing such as causing a miscarriage (Liamputtong 
et al. 2003; Markens et al. 1999; Pilnick et al. 2004), the inaccuracies and unreliability of 
procedures (Gottfreðsdóttir et al. 2009a; van den Berg et al. 2008), a lack of information 
on procedures being provided (García et al. 2008; Gross and Shuval 2008), concerns 
among expectant parents regarding the emotional impact of intervention (Markens et 
al. 1999; McNeill et al. 2009; van den Berg 2005a), information not being provided to 
certain ethnic and socio-economic groups (Dormandy et al. 2005), a fear and mistrust of 
medicine and its values (Gross and Shuval 2008), the complexity and inconclusiveness 
of risk information (Heyman et al. 2006; Markens et al. 1999), expectant parents ruling 
out the possibility of diagnostic testing or terminating a pregnancy (McNeill et al. 2009; 
van den Berg et al. 2005a), and personal and/or religious values about the worth of 
children with Down’s syndrome and disabilities more generally (Gottfreðsdóttir et al. 
2009a; Liamputtong et al. 2003; Remennick 2006). Once more, these studies identify 
how decision-making processes are complex, fluid, and intricate, with expectant parents 
likely to justify not screening for Down’s syndrome with reference to any number of 
these rationalisations. 
 
Interactions between parents and practitioners 
Research on Down’s syndrome screening, as well as concentrating largely on decision-
making processes of expectant parents, also explores their interactions with healthcare 
practitioners. Previous studies identify how Down’s syndrome screening is carried out 
by midwives (Dormandy et al. 2006; Ekelin and Crang-Svalenius 2004; Samwill 2002), 
doctors (Burton-Jeangros et al. 2013; Driscoll et al. 2009; Marteau et al. 1993), or 
midwives and doctors interchangeably (Pilnick 2004; Smith et al. 1994; Williams et al. 
2002a) rather than genetic counsellors and clinical geneticists. Notwithstanding their 
specialism, practitioners are often discussed in relation to “informed choice” and how 
practitioners are expected to provide “non-directive care,” each translating to tendering 
medically-accurate information to expectant parents detached from any personal biases 
(Schwennesen and Koch 2012; Sooben 2010; van den Berg 2005b). Notions of choice 
and autonomy are at the heart of current discourses in Western healthcare systems 
(Williams et al. 2002a), placing an emphasis on looking and listening to “grant patients 
their life as well as knowing them as if they were dead” (Mol and Law 2004, 44). In this 
context, reproductive technologies are heralded as a route to liberation since they offer 
expectant parents information about, and control over, their offspring (García et al. 
2008; Seavilleklein 2009). However, others show that this is not always empowering 
(Lippman 1994; Pilnick 2008; Williams et al. 2002b). 
Several studies capture how expectant parents do not perceive their care as non-
directive; the stating of options, in turn, does not always amount to the neutral 
provision of advice since some options have the force of an instruction (Browner et al. 
1996; Hunt et al. 2005; Lippman 1991; Pilnick 2008; Williams et al. 2002b). Indeed, 
some have censured practitioners for providing biased information, their conduct being 
viewed as coercive and directive rather than passive and facilitating (Marteau et al. 
1993; Tsouroufli 2011). Since knowledge is reproduced during interactions, the likes of 
Gothard (2011, 68) suggest that what we regard as a choice is never a value-free activity 
and is always made “within the context of social, cultural and community influences,” 
few of which are simple or transparent. Whilst some are sympathetic for practitioners 
who struggle with balancing professional and private values (Anderson 1999; Farsides 
et al. 2004; Williams et al. 2002a) which can compromise informed choice (Marteau et 
al., 1992), others doubt whether fully autonomous and informed decision-making 
within the context of Down’s syndrome screening can ever exist (Pilnick 2004). 
Practitioners encountering difficulty in communicating screening information 
whilst remaining non-directive and ensuring informed choice is reported elsewhere 
(García et al. 2008; Heyman et al. 2006; Pilnick et al. 2004). This stems from the conflict 
between the time practitioners have available to explain screening and the time needed 
to discuss the procedure (Sooben 2010; Vassy 2006; Williams et al. 2002a), the trouble 
of conveying (risk) information and the practical/ethical aspects of screening (Burton-
Jeangros et al. 2013; Ekelin and Crang-Svalenius 2004; Heyman et al. 2006; Hunt et al. 
2005), communication breakdowns when expectant parents’ first language is not the 
native language (Hey and Hurst 2003), and the different definitions between expectant 
parents and practitioners of what constitutes a “normal result” and/or “normal child” 
(Hunt et al. 2005; Vassy 2006; Williams 2006). Additionally, research shows how some 
practitioners do not know how to best support higher-risk expectant parents (Getz and 
Kirkengen 2003; Williams et al. 2002a, 2002c), how some expectant parents are not 
fully aware of the key features of Down’s syndrome prior to screening and testing 
(Williams et al. 2002c), and how expectant parents may not fully understand or have 
realistic expectations of screening (Burton-Jeangros et al. 2013; Gammons et al. 2010; 
van den Berg 2005b). Such difficulties cast doubt on whether the ethical principles of 
“choice” and “autonomy” are realistic in modern healthcare systems. 
Some studies have explored how practitioners can respond to such difficulties. 
Burton-Jeangros et al. (2013) show how practitioners commonly draw on subjective 
interpretations and cultural meanings of scientific productions (i.e. risk factors) to erect 
an understanding. In addition, Burton-Jeangros et al. (2013) and Ivry (2006) reveal how 
practitioners can withhold some information from expectant parents around possible 
pregnancy outcomes to avoid causing unnecessary anxiety. Whilst this care is directive, 
this may not always be defined as bad practice. During interviews with practitioners, 
Schwennesen and Koch (2012: 283) show how their conduct, whilst perhaps not always 
immediately compatible with the non-directive ethos, can constitute “good care.” By 
answering expectant parents’ appeal for some direction, for instance, practitioners 
move closer to promising “informed choice” by supporting them to make meaningful 
decisions largely on the basis of uncertain knowledge. Rather than this being described 
as a serious problem of oppressive power resulting in coercive moments of decision-
making, such actions are categorised as ensuring informed choice since non-directive 
care may not always be the most suitable response (Schwennesen and Koch 2012; 
Williams et al. 2002b). 
Nonetheless, many of these studies show how Down’s syndrome screening – 
particularly when involving interactions between expectant parents and practitioners – 
presents a number of perhaps irresolvable problems for each respective party. Others 
have reported further concerns around how practitioners, whilst sometimes critical of 
screening techniques for inducing unnecessary anxiety and limiting expectant parents’ 
decision-making capacity (Burton-Jeangros et al. 2013; Williams et al. 2002c), are both 
undertrained in communicating screening information (Cleary-Goodman et al. 2006; 
Sandall et al. 2001; Skirton and Barr 2007) and hold limited knowledge of Down’s 
syndrome (Dormandy et al. 2006; Skirton and Barr 2010) and screening for the 
condition (Farsides et al. 2004; Hey and Hurst 2003; Samwill 2002; Smith et al. 1994; 
Williams et al. 2002c). This involves having little direct contact during medical training 
with people who have developmental disabilities (Cleary-Goldman et al. 2006; Driscoll 
et al. 2009). Many such studies conclude, thus, that Down’s syndrome screening is a 
problematic practice and further training/policy intervention is recommended. 
 
Knowledge gaps 
The substance and contribution of the reviewed studies is irrefutable. However, existing 
insights can be subjected to a number of criticisms. I highlight these knowledge gaps for 
the remainder of this article. First, some important voices are missing, or at least 
relatively silent, in the literature. This includes expectant fathers who, whilst vocal in 
some studies (Draper 2002), are often neglected in favour of studying pregnant women. 
In addition, there is a scarcity of research on expectant parents who decide to terminate 
a pregnancy, though I suspect practical and ethical concerns explain this absence. 
Nonetheless, exceptions are available (Helm et al. 1998; Korenromp et al. 2007; Olarte 
Sierra 2010; Reist 2006; Skotko 2005; Tymstra et al. 2004) and it would be valuable for 
researchers to further explore the views of the minority of expectant parents continuing 
a pregnancy after a Down’s syndrome diagnosis. Research also frequently disregards 
expectant mothers at an “advanced maternal age”. Whilst research has attended to how 
expectant mothers cite their age when accounting for their decision-making processes, 
very few (if any) have explored the implications the label of “advanced maternal age” 
has for their identity-work. This becomes more significant when considering how 
mothers are frequently categorised as morally responsible for containing risks and 
preventing harm to born/unborn children (Gottfreðsdóttir et al. 2009b; García et al. 
2011; Lupton 2013; Wolf 2011). Additionally, this reflects how pregnant women are 
often presented as a homogenous group within such research, with little attention being 
paid to how attributes such as age, class, race, and social/economic background play a 
role in screening practices. This also relates to dismissing the importance of the cultural 
context on expectant parents’ attitudes toward screening, although Ivry (2006, 2009) 
provides excellent exceptions. Furthermore, as noted by Pilnick and Zayts (2012), 
expectant parents who receive a higher-risk for Down’s syndrome have been the subject 
of little research. Whilst such research exists (Burton-Jeangros et al. 2013; Heyman et al. 
2006), it is by no means abundant. Finally, whilst research on practitioners exists, this 
likewise generates a relatively undersized literature (McCourt 2002; Tsouroufli 2011; 
Williams et al. 2002a, 2002c). The important findings of these small but limited 
collections of research indicate that these groups deserve more attention beyond the 
brevity they are currently afforded. 
A second criticism is that research is regularly based on retrospective accounts 
of expectant parents and practitioners (Aune and Möller 2012; Bryant et al. 2010; 
Burton-Jeangros et al. 2013; García et al. 2008; Gottfreðsdóttir et al. 2009a; Heyman 
2010; McNeill et al. 2009; Press and Browner 1998; Santalahti et al. 1998; Williams et 
al. 2005). Focusing solely on practitioners, studies commonly use questionnaire and/or 
interview data or, more problematically, ground arguments in post-hoc accounts of 
expectant parents (Gammons et al. 2010; Skotko 2005; Sooben 2010). Whilst a key 
locus of enquiry, methodological choices in many studies of expectant parents and 
practitioners, predominantly questionnaires (Jaques et al. 2004; Samwill 2002; Smith et 
al. 1994; van den Berg 2005a) and interviews (Burton-Jeangros et al. 2013; Farsides et 
al. 2004; Williams 2002b, 2000c), make invisible the mundane aspects of, and meaning-
making practices in, medical encounters. By de-contextualising context-specific 
situations and relying on romantic conceptions of a rational experiencing individual, 
such research is rarely grounded in ethnographic data which would capture how 
screening is enacted, managed, and negotiated between practitioners and expectant 
parents in everyday routines. Indeed, as Jerolmack and Khan (2013, 13) claim, what 
people say is frequently a poor predictor of what they do; “to escape [this] attitudinal 
fallacy, we must study interaction.” Ethnographic exceptions are evident (Heyman and 
Henriksen 2001; Hunt et al. 2005; Ivry 2006, 2009; McCourt 2002; Pilnick 2004, 2008; 
Pilnick and Zayts 2012; Schwennesen and Koch 2012) but they are far from abundant 
and, more critically, often focus on consultations of Down’s syndrome screening alone. 
This is a grave sampling error since it mistakes a part for the whole; consultations, 
indeed, are only a microcosm for all aspects of medical work around prenatal screening 
for Down’s syndrome. 
A third criticism is that many studies on Down’s syndrome screening fail to fully 
discuss the condition and subscribe to medical definitions of Down’s syndrome or 
disability more generally. Exceptions have been identified; Sooben (2010), for instance, 
claims practitioners provide a functional and brief description of Down’s syndrome 
during screening which conforms to a biomedical problem orientation. Bryant et al. 
(2006) similarly argue that antenatal settings currently provide little opportunity for 
people to discuss and explore their beliefs about disability. In an analysis of descriptive 
information about Down’s syndrome in antenatal leaflets, Bryant et al. (2001) and 
Murray et al. (2001) suggest this literature contains false, misleading, and inconsistent 
information and fashions a negative image of the condition. However, studies have not 
conducted extensive empirical research, particularly through in-depth ethnographic 
observations of clinical settings, on how Down’s syndrome is discussed within screening 
consultations and how accusations of screening fostering a belief that Down’s syndrome 
should be prevented (Alderson 2001; Sooben 2010; Vassy 2006) play out in the clinic. 
Specifically, few focus on its definition as a “risk,” a discourse which implies impending 
danger which should be avoided (Douglas 1992; Shakespeare 1999), and how this 
produces effects for parents and practitioners. A valuable contribution, for instance, 
could be an exploration of how risk communication homogenises Down’s syndrome and 
masks the sizeable physiological and intellectual variation of people with the condition. 
Nonetheless, the small number of studies discussing Down’s syndrome in antenatal care 
often fail to recognise how disability more generally emerges through cultural ideas of 
“the normal” and how it is shaped by a complex interplay of social, cultural, material, 
biological, economic, and political factors (Author forthcoming [2014]; Barnes and 
Mercer 2010; Davis 1995; Ginsburg and Rapp 2013; Oliver 1990; Shakespeare 1999). 
 
Conclusion 
In this article, I have reviewed research on parent and practitioner experiences of 
screening for Down’s syndrome. It is a practice which has revolutionised reproductive 
medicine and changed our conceptions of pregnancy, parenthood, the family, and ideas 
surrounding the “normal.” I have shown how current research on Down’s syndrome 
screening focuses on either the decision-making practices of expectant parents or the 
interactions between parents and practitioners. I conclude by acknowledging the gaps 
in existing insights and the fruitful avenues for future exploration. Rather than 
repeating earlier expositions, that is, of pouring old wine into new wineskins, I suggest 
that sociologists should take account of these openings. I personally press, as a matter of 
urgency, carrying out a context-privy analysis of clinical practice regarding Down’s 
syndrome screening. A close ethnographic reading of everyday affairs will unmask the 
ongoing, complex, and diverse ways in which knowledge, meanings, and positions are 
produced and reproduced in the hospital. Through ethnographic fieldwork, we become 
attentive to ordinary information usually invisible and taken-for-granted rather than 
allowing implicit assumptions to govern understandings. In doing so, we may well fill in 
the remaining gaps of knowledge outlined above. 
 
Notes 
1. I often cite statistics for Down’s syndrome screening from England and Wales. This is 
because the statistics are easily accessible (since England and Wales has a standardised 
healthcare system) and because this is where I conducted my research. 
2. Other conditions including Edward’s syndrome (Trisomy 18) and Patau’s syndrome 
(Trisomy 13) may be suspected via prenatal screening, and confirmed via diagnostic 
testing, for Down’s syndrome. 
3. Meta-syntheses were excluded from the article. See Reid et al. (2009) for an excellent 
meta-synthesis on pregnant women’s decision-making processes around screening for 
Down syndrome. 
4. A nuchal translucency is the fluid thickness in the nape of an unborn baby’s neck. 
Enlarged fluid is associated with chromosomal conditions including Down’s syndrome. 
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